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Abstract
The paper analyzes the effects of financial liberalization on inflation. We de-
velop a monetary and endogenous growth, dynamic general equilibrium model
of a small open semi-industrialized economy, with financial intermediaries sub-
jected to obligatory ”high” reserve ratio, serving as the source of financial repres-
sion. When calibrated to four Southern European semi-industrialized countries,
namely Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal, that typically had high reserve require-
ments, the model indicates a positive inflation-financial repression relationship
irrespective of the the specification of preferences. But the strength of the rela-
tionship obtained from the model is found to be much smaller in size than the
corresponding empirical estimates.
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1 Introduction
The primary objective of this paper is to analyze the effect of financial liberalization on the rate of inflation
using an open economy monetary endogenous growth model. Secondly, in order to quantify the effects
of financial liberalization on inflation, we calibrate the dynamic general equilibrium model to four southern
European economies —Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, over the period of 1980–1998.1 Financial repression
can be broadly defined as a set of government legal restrictions, like interest rate ceilings, compulsory credit
allocation and high reserve requirements, that generally prevent the financial intermediaries from functioning
at their full capacity level.
The motivation for developing an model of a financially repressed small open economy is basically twofold:
Firstly, the paper tries to fill up the dearth, in the literature, of comprehensive microfounded models that can
be calibrated. And secondly, the paper stresses on the importance of including import of intermediate goods
in an open economy model aimed at analyzing macroeconomic implications following a change in domestic
policy.
In regard to lack of models analyzing financial repression in an open economic environment, the Nag
and Mukhopadhyay (1998) and the Kang and Sawada (2000) studies are notable exceptions. Nag and
Mukhopadhyay (1998) indicated that, financial liberalization brings down the inflation rate and improves the
performance of the real sector once one allows for exchange rate flexibility in the current account and import
penetration in the production structure. While, Kang and Sawada (2000) presented an endogenous growth
model which simultaneously incorporated the role of financial development, human capital investment, and
external openness. The study indicated that financial development and trade liberalization increases the
growth rate of the economy by enhancing the marginal benefits of human capital investment and vice-versa.
Further, an expansionist government is found to be likely to increase the growth rate of money supply,
repress the financial sector, close the economy, and impose a high income tax rate to obtain increases in the
seigniorage revenue. Unfortunately, the fall out of such repressive policies are higher inflation rate and a
lower economic growth rate that will not be sustainable. The paper, thus, advocate openness and financial
1The choice of the sample period is to maintain uniformity with respect to definitions of data. Note while, Italy, Portugal
and Spain joined the the European Monetary Union in 1998, Greece got included in 2002.
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development as the basic requirements of sustainable economic development.
However, the studies have their own limitations. The study by Nag and Mukhopadhyay (1998), lacks any
microfoundations and cannot be calibrated to any economy due to the restrictive assumptions of the model.
The Kang and Sawada (2000) model, though has properly laid out microfoundations, is purely theoretical
with a structure that is not conducive to calibration. We emphasize on the role of calibration to not only
sign the relationship between financial repression and inflation but, also to measure the “strength” of the
relationship. Moreover, the “strength”, when compared to the simple regression coefficients between inflation
and financial repression, would also tell us about the performance of the dynamic general equilibrium model
in their ability to replicate the data. The results, in turn, would help us realize the modifications, if at all,
we need to make to our existing general equilibrium model for making better policy prescriptions.
Another notable concern with the Kang and Sawada (2000) study, is that they ignore the importance
of the import of intermediate goods, while making their conclusions. Serven (1995) indicates that the
ignorance of intermediate and capital goods import is bound to provide an “incomplete – and potentially
misleading” – assessment of macroeconomic implications of domestic policy changes. Carmichael, Ke´ita and
Samson (1999) also emphasizes the importance of intermediate good imports in the production process, when
analyzing business cycles with liquidity constraints for a small open economy. And more recently, Nag and
Mukhopadhyay (1998) and Nag (2000), stresses on the role of imported intermediate inputs, while discussing
issues of stabilization. In addition to these studies, Boileu (1999, 2002), using two-country dynamic general
equilibrium models, discusses the role of import of equipments and machineries when analyzing the volatility
of net-exports and terms of trade.. Hence, in order to prevent any misleading macroeconomic assessment of
financial liberalization, we model intermediate goods explicitly in the production process.
The paper is structured as follows: Besides the introduction and the conclusion, Section 2, outlines the
rationale behind the choice of economies for our calibration and how we measure the severity of financial
repression. Section 3 and 4 discusses the basic structure, equilibrium and balanced growth path of the
model. Section 5 lays out the process of calibration. And, Section 6 deals with the inflationary dynamics of
liberalizing the domestic financial sector, which in our case, is portrayed in the form of a relaxation of the
reserve–deposit ratio.
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2 The Metric for Financial Repression and the Choice of Sample
Economies
This section is devoted for rationalizing our choice of the sample economies, the metric for financial repression,
and also to point out the importance of intermediate good imports in the production process. We follow
Bacchetta and Caminal (1992), Haslag and Hein (1995), Espinosa and Yip (1996), Haslag (1998) and Haslag
and Koo (1999) in using the “size” of obligatory reserve requirements held by commercial banks as the metric
for the degree of financial repression. It must be realized that nothing should prevent our existing general
equilibrium analysis to be used in studying other developing economies subjected to a repressed financial
structure, mainly through the imposition of“high” reserve requirements. The four European economies
chosen are,hence, merely examples of countries that matches the assumptions of our model. Our choice of
the sample is vindicated by observations that can be made from Tables 1 and 2.
Table 1, along with sizes of reserve requirements and annual rate of inflation, outlines the periods over
which major interest rates were deregulated and credit ceilings were relaxed in some important European
economies. Clearly, economies with higher average reserve requirements are observed to experience higher
average rate of inflation. Besides this, an interesting feature stands out, while on one hand, the capital
markets were being deregulated, the required bank reserves were much higher in Greece, Italy, Portugal and
Spain, when compared to Belgium, France, Germany and the U.K. Moreover, as Table-2 indicates, while
financial liberalization was in process, with interest rates being determined by the market, the bank reserve
ratios increased significantly in the late 1980s, in three out of the four Southern European countries of our
concern.
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
In order to evaluate the relationship between inflation and financial repression for our economies we
run a simple two-variable regressional analysis between inflation and the reserve–deposit ratio. The results
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are reported in Table-3. Note that except for Greece the data indicates a positive relationship between
inflation and financial repression. Further, except for Spain the positive relationship between inflation
and the financial repression parameter is significant. The negative relationship in Greece is an exception,
especially when one realizes that the positive relationship between the reserve requirements and inflation has
been well documented in the empirical literature.2
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
Table 4 indicates that, even though size of the FDI as a percentage of GDP is quite small, intermediate
goods as a percentage of both total trade and GDP are quite sizeable, and hence, cannot be ignored. The
percentage of of intermediate goods lies between 12.44 percent (Greece) and 17.03 percent (Italy). Besides,
as can be observed from Table 4 the figures are comparable to other developed European economies as
well. On the other hand, the percentage of intermediate goods is found to be between 6.21 percent (Italy)
and 13.09 percent (Greece). As with the figures of intermediate goods to total trade, the percentages of
intermediate good imports to GDP are quite comparable to four industrialized economies in Europe.
So in summary, there are two essential features in our economic environment. First, financial repression
is modeled through banks having to hold “high” levels of obligatory reserve requirements. And, we model
the intermediate goods explicitly in the production process, given their importance in the trade structure.
Following Karapatakis (1992), we assume that import of intermediate goods are constrained by loan avail-
ability. The rationale is as follows: Given that, foreign suppliers usually require prepayment for the foreign
inputs, firms may not be willing to tie-up all their retained earnings trying to finance the imports.
3 Economic Environment
We modify and extend the theoretical framework of Chari, Jones and Manuelli (1995), used to analyze
inflation-growth correlations in the context of developed economies to suit the requirements of a financially
repressed small open semi-industrialized economic structure. Given that we are trying to analyze the im-
portance of financial sector distortions on inflation and exchange rate movements, it is essential to model
2See, for example, Haslag (1998), and Haslag and Koo (1999).
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the banking system explicitly. Besides, realizing the importance of import of intermediate goods we allow
for the co-existence of an intermediated input (imported intermediate goods) and the un-intermediated in-
put in the production structure. In this regard the banking system plays a crucial role since the imported
intermediate goods requirement are assumed to be completely financed through bank loans. Thus for the
imported input to be used in the production process, consumers must place deposit in the banking system
and firms must borrow these deposits in the form of loans to meet the cash requirements of the foreign sup-
pliers. Assumptions of small open economy allows us to treat the foreign price as parametric. The domestic
un-intermediated capital will be assumed to be rented directly from the households. We will denote the
domestic capital by k and the intermediated foreign input by k∗.
Financial repression is modeled through the banks being obligated to hold a “high” fraction of their
deposits as fiat currency, serving as an easy source of seigniorage revenue for the government. We consider
an infinitely-lived representative agent model with no uncertainty and complete markets. The economy is
populated by four types of decision makers: households, banks, firms, and the government. In this model
the home-produced consumption good will be assumed to be a credit good.3. Note that money is valued in
this economy simply because the banks are obligated to hold a fraction of the deposits as cash reserves. The
domestic consumption and investment goods are produced by the same technology. Since all goods in the
domestic economy are perfect substitutes in the production side, they sell for the same nominal price.
The resource constraint in the model economy is given by
ct + ikt + iht + xt 6 F (kt, k∗t , ntht), (1)
where pt is the domestic price level; ct is the consumption of domestic credit good ; ikt and iht are the
domestic investment purchases in physical and human capital respectively; xt denotes the exports of the
small-open economy; kt is the stock of domestic physical capital; k∗t is the purchase of imported intermediate
good; ntht denotes effective labor, given that nt is the hours of labor and ht is the stock of human capital;
and F is the production function. Physical and human capital evolve according to the following processes,
respectively kt+1 6 (1− δk)kt + ikt and ht+1 6 (1− δh)ht + iht, where δk and δh are the depreciation rates.
3Including an imported consumption good in the utility function of the individual does not alter the essence of the results
obtained.
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Trading in the economy can be captured by the following sequence: At the beginning of each period, a
securities market opens. The households receive their factor earnings (capital and labor) from the previous
period, the net of tax principal and interest from their past savings, and any lump-sum transfers from the
government. At this time, households make payments for the credit (consumption) goods and make savings
decisions for the future. Note the only source of savings for the households are in the form of deposit
contracts maturing in one period offered by the financial intermediaries. The deposits are used to make
loans and acquire fiat money. The banks hold fiat money to satisfy a reserve requirement. We assume that
no resources are required to operate the banking system.
On the production side, firms rent the domestic capital directly from the households but they must
borrow cash from the financial intermediaries to purchase the imported intermediate good. This is because
they start the period with no cash, since the free entry and exit in the perfectly competitive product market
washes out all profits. The firm produces units of the domestic consumption and exportable good using a
constant returns to scale production technology involving the un-intermediated domestic physical capital,
human capital and the imported intermediate good as the three inputs.
The government taxes income and makes lump-sum transfer payments to the households. The government
can finance the deficit in any period through seigniorage and issuing external debt. For the sake of simplicity
and technical reasons outlined below, we assume that there are no domestic government bonds.
3.1 Consumers
We assume that there are large number of identical households that solves the following dynamic problem:
V = max
c1t,nst ,dt,ht+1,kt+1
∞∑
t=0
βtu(c1t, 1− nt) (2)
s.t. : dt 6

[ptwtntht](1− τt) + (1− τt)ptrtkt
+[1 + (1− τt)Rdt]dt−1 − ptct−
+Tt − ptiht − ptikt

(3)
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kt+1 6 (1− δk)kt + ikt (4)
ht+1 6 (1− δh)ht + iht (5)
with dt−1, τt, ht, kt, Rdt, wt, rt and pt as given. Note β is the discount factor; u is the consumer’s utility;
dt−1 is the deposits in the banking system; ht is the stock of human capital at the beginning of period t; Rdt
is the nominal interest rate paid on deposits at the end of period t; τt is the tax rate on income; Tt is the
size of the transfer to the household delivered for use in period t; wt is the real wage rate and; rt is the real
rental of domestic capital. So consumers maximize their lifetime utility (equation (2)) subject to equations
(3), (4) and (5), to determine a contingency plan for {c1t, dt, nst , ht+1, kt+1}∞t=0.
The consumer’s optimization problem can be written in the following recursive formulation.
J(dt−1, ht, kt) = max
nst ,dt,ht+1,kt+1

u(atpt − dtpt − iht − ikt, 1− nt)
+βJ(dt, ht+1, kt+1)
 (6)
where at = [ptwtntht](1− τt) + (1− τt)ptrtk1t + [1 + (1− τt)Rdt]dt−1 + Tt. The upshot of the dynamic
programming problem are the following first order conditions:
dt :
u1(ct, 1− nt)
pt
− βJ1(dt, ht+1, kt+1) = 0 (7)
nst : u1(ct, 1− nt)[wtht(1− τt)]− u2(ct, 1− nt) = 0 (8)
ht+1 : −u1(ct, 1− nt) + βJ2(dt, ht+1, kt+1) = 0 (9)
kt+1 : −u1(ct, 1− nt) + βJ3(dt, ht+1, kt+1) = 0 (10)
Along with the following envelope conditions
J1(dt−1, ht, kt) =
u1(ct, 1− nt)[1 + (1− τt)Rdt]
pt
(11)
J2(dt−1, ht, kt) = u1(ct, 1− nt)[wtnt(1− τt) + (1− δh)] (12)
J3(dt, ht, kt) = u1(ct, 1− nt)[rt(1− τt) + (1− δk)] (13)
In addition, a transversality condition is necessary to ensure the existence of the household’s present-
value budget constraint. This terminal constraint can be interpreted as a “non-ponzi” condition in which
the household cannot borrow against the sum of future deposits and domestic capital, at a rate higher than
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that can be repaid. Mathematically, the transversality condition is represented as
lim
T→∞
[
dT + kT∏T−1
s=0 [
1+(1−τs)Rs
pis
]
]
(14)
where pi is the gross rate of inflation. As such the date-t budget constraint of the household can be written
in the form of an infinite horizon, present-value budget constraint.
Using the first order conditions along with the envelope conditions, the consumer’s problem yields the
following set of efficiency conditions.
u1(ct, 1− nt)
pt
= β
u1(ct+1, 1− nt+1)[1 + (1− τt+1)Rdt+1]
pt+1
(15)
u1(ct, 1− nt)
u2(ct, 1− nt) =
1
[wtht(1− τt)] (16)
u1(ct, 1− nt) = βu1(ct+1, 1− nt+1)[wt+1nt+1(1− τt+1) + (1− δh)] (17)
u1(ct, 1− nt) = βu1(ct+1, 1− nt+1)[rt+1(1− τt+1) + (1− δk)] (18)
Equation (16) is the efficiency condition for consumption. On the left hand side is the marginal cost of
consuming one less unit of the consumption good and on the right-hand side is the marginal benefit obtained
from future savings. Equation (17) indicates that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption
and leisure must be equal to the ratio of their prices. Equation (18) is the efficiency condition for human
capital. The left hand side of the equation is the marginal cost while the right hand side indicates the
stream of future benefit adjusted for the depreciation from the investment in human capital. Equation (19)
is the efficiency condition for domestic physical capital. The left hand side of the equation is the marginal
cost while the right hand side indicates the stream of future benefit adjusted for the depreciation from the
investment in physical capital.
Moreover, from the above set of conditions, specifically (16), (18) and (19) it is easy to derive that
arbitrage leads to equivalent real rates of return for the alternative investment choices available to the
consumer.
[
pt(1 + (1− τt+1)Rdt+1)
pt+1
]
= [wt+1nt+1(1− τt+1) + (1− δh)] = [rt+1(1− τt+1) + (1− δk)] (19)
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3.2 Financial Intermediaries
At the start of the period the financial intermediaries accept deposits and make their portfolio decision, loans
and cash reserves choices, with a goal of maximizing profits. At the end of the period they receive their
interest income from the loans made and meets the interest obligations on the deposits. Note the intermedi-
aries are constrained by legal requirements on the choice of their portfolio (that is, reserve requirements), as
well as by feasibility. Given such a structure, the intermediaries obtains the optimal choice for Lt by solving
the following problem:
max
L,d
pibt = RLtLt −Rdtdt (20)
s.t. : γtdt + Lt 6 dt (21)
where pibt is the profit function for the financial intermediary at time t, andmt > γtdt defines the legal reserve
requirement. mt is the cash reserves held by the bank, Lt is the loans, and γt is the reserve requirement
ratio. The reserve requirement ratio is the ratio of required reserves (which must be held in form of currency)
to deposits.
To gain some economic intuition of the role of reserve requirements, let us consider the solution of the
problem for a typical intermediary. Free entry, drives profits to zero and we have
RLt(1− γt)−Rdt = 0 (22)
Simplifying, in equilibrium, the following condition must hold
RLt =
Rdt
1− γt (23)
Reserve requirements thus tend to induce a wedge between the interest rate on savings and lending rates
for the financial intermediary.
3.3 Firms
The firms rent the domestic un-intermediated capital, k, directly from the households and purchases the
foreign intermediate good, k∗, using financing from the banks. Formally, the firms face the following problem:
10
W = max
kt,k
∗
t ,(ntht)
∞∑
i=0
ρt

(1− τt) [ptF (kt, k∗t , ntht)− ptwtntht − ptrtk1t −RLt−1Lt−1]
+Lt − etp∗t ik∗t − Lt−1
 (24)
s.t. : (i) et−1p∗t−1k
∗
t 6 Lt−1 (25)
(ii) k∗t+1 6 ik∗t (26)
where ρt is the subjective discount factor used by the firms; et is the nominal exchange rate at date-t and;
p∗t is the world price at date-t. Note that the loan constraint, equation (25), implies that from the firm’s
point of view, it may as well be renting the imported capital or intermediate goods from the bank itself,
which in turn obtains them from the foreign suppliers on behalf of the firms. Moreover, the loans are strictly
one period loans. Because of these assumptions, as pointed out by Chari, Jones and Manuelli (1995), the
firm can be seen as facing a static problem; hence, one of the implications of the equilibrium conditions of
this version of the model is that the choice of ρt is immaterial. Moreover, given that intermediate goods
are goods which are used up in the production of other goods by the end of the period, we have the second
constraint. Formally, implying that the depreciation rate is 100 percent.
The up-shot of the above static problem of the firm yields the following efficiency conditions:
kt : F1(t) = rt (27)
k∗t : (1− τ)F2(t) =
(
et−1p∗t−1
pt−1
)(
pt−1(1 + (1− τt)RLt)
pt
)
(28)
(ntht) : F3(t) = wt (29)
where Fi(t), i= 1, 2, 3: denotes the marginal product the domestic capital, imported intermediate good
and effective labor. As given by equations (27) and (28) respectively, the production firm set their after-tax
marginal products of the un-intermediated domestic capital and the intermediated imported good equal to
their respective after-tax real rentals. And equation (29) simply states that the firm hires effective labor up
to the point where the marginal product of effective labor equates the real wage.
Note combining (19), (23), (27) and (28), we obtain the following relation between the marginal products
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of the domestic capital and the imported capital good:
[1 + (1− γt)
(
(1− τt) F2(t)pt
et−1p∗t−1
− 1
)
] =
pt
pt−1
[F1(t)(1− τt) + (1− δk)] (30)
A close analysis of equation (30) reveals that increases in the financial repression parameter, γ raises F2
relative to F1. So higher reserve requirements tend to distort the mix of domestic capital and intermediate
goods. The reason for this distortion is the financial repression that exists in the economy in the form of
non-interest bearing assets (cash reserves) in the portfolio of the financial intermediaries. This requirement
causes a wedge between the rental rates of the two type of assets, which in turn distorts the input mix.
3.4 Government
The government commits to a sequence {Tt}∞t=0 of transfers which are financed by a combination of taxes,
seigniorage and issuance of external debt. The government’s budget constraint, in nominal terms, is
Tt = mt −mt−1 + τtptF (kt, k∗t , ntht) + et
[
b∗t+1 − (1 + r∗t )b∗t
]
(31)
where b∗t is the size of the domestic bond holding by foreigners at time t; and r∗t is the exogenously given world
nominal interest rate paid on the domestic bonds. The government has at its disposal two tools of monetary
policy, the reserve requirement and the rate of money growth, and the income-tax rate, the transfers and
foreign public debt as the three tools of fiscal policy. We will assume that money evolves according to the
policy rule mt = µtmt−1, where µ is the money growth rate.
Note a transversality condition is necessary to ensure the existence of the government’s present-value
budget constraint. The government’s terminal constraint is interpreted as a non-ponzi condition in which
the government cannot go on borrowing from the foreigners for ever. Formally, the transversality condition
is represented as
lim
T→∞
[
b∗T∏T−1
s=0 [1 + r∗s ]
]
(32)
A notable exception from the government budget constraint is the domestic government bonds. Besides,
being a simplification, bonds are ignored for a technical reason. In a world of no uncertainty incorporating
government bonds in either the consumer or bank problem would imply plausible multiplicity of optimal
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allocations of deposits or loans and government bonds, since the arbitrage conditions would imply a relative
price of one between deposits or loans and government debt. One way to incorporate government bonds is
to have the financial intermediaries hold government bonds as part of obligatory reserve requirements. Or
alternatively, assume that there exists a fixed ratio of government bonds to money. The conclusions of our
analysis remains unchanged following such alternative specifications with the former merely inflating the
repression parameter.
3.5 Balance of Payments
By definition, the Balance of Payments (BP ) comprises of the Current and the Capital Accounts, denoted
respectively by, CA and KA. The CA includes the Trade Balance (TB) and the net debt service payments
abroad, herein the services due to the foreign debt position of the model economy. The KA in turn captures
the net foreign savings inflow into the economy. Formally, the BP , CA, TB and the KA at any time period
t is given by the following expressions:
BPt = CAt +KAt (33)
CAt = TBt − r∗t
b∗t
p∗t
(34)
TBt = xt − etp
∗
t
pt
k∗t+1 (35)
KAt =
(b∗t+1 − b∗t )
p∗t
(36)
The nominal exchange rate will be determined according to the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) condition,
P = eP ∗, and the net position of the foreign assets at steady state, b∗, will be deduced from the balance of
payment equilibrium condition, BP = 0.
xt − etp
∗
t
pt
k∗t+1 +
[
b∗t+1 − (1 + r∗t )b∗t
]
p∗t
= 0 (37)
Without any loss of generality and maintaining consistency with perpetual growth, the exports of the
economy, xt, will be assumed to be a fixed fraction ϕ of the domestic output. Further given that p∗ is
parametrically given to the small-open economy, we set it to unitary without any loss of generality. Hence
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implying that the domestic price level and the nominal exchange rates are synonymous for the model economy
with the PPP condition satisfied, i.e., pt = et.
4 Equilibrium and Balanced–Growth Equations
An equilibrium in this model economy is a sequence of prices {pt, et, wt, rt, RLt, Rdt}∞t=0, real allocations
{ct, nt, kt, ht, ikt , k∗t , ik∗t , iht}∞t=0, stocks of financial assets {mt, dt}∞t=0, exogenous sequences of {p∗t , r∗t }∞t=0,
and policy variables {γt, µt, τt, Tt, b∗t }∞t=0 such that:
1. The allocations and stocks of financial assets solve the household’s date–t maximization problem, (2),
given prices, exogenous and policy variables.
2. The stock of financial assets solve the bank’s date–t profit maximization problem, (20), given prices,
exogenous and policy variables.
3. The real allocations solve the firm’s date–t profit maximization problem, (24), given prices, exogenous
and policy variables.
4. The money market equilibrium condition: mt = γtdt is satisfied for all t > 0.
5. The loanable funds market equilibrium condition: et−1p∗t−1k
∗
t = (1− γt−1)dt−1 where the total supply
of loans Lt = (1− γt)dt is satisfied for all t > 0.
6. The equilibrium condition in the external sector: BP = 0 holds, along with the PPP condition being
satisfied.
7. The labor market equilibrium condition: nstht = (ntht)
d for all t > 0.
8. The goods market equilibrium condition require: (1), ct + ikt + iht + xt = F (kt, k∗t , ntht). is satisfied
for all t > 0.
9. The Government budget is balanced on a period-by-period basis.
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To study the long–run behavior of the model, we use the solutions to the maximization problems of
the consumer, financial intermediary and the firm together with the equilibrium conditions to calculate the
balanced growth equations. Along a balanced growth path output grows at a constant rate. In general for
the economy to follow such a path, both the preference and the production functions must take on special
forms. On the preference side, the consumer, when faced with a stationary path of interest rates must
generate a demand for constant growth in consumption. The requirement is
u(ct, 1− nt) =

[ct(1−nt)ψ]1−σ
1−σ for σ 6= 1,
log ct + ψ log(1− nt) for σ = 1.
(38)
where ψ and σ are preference parameters
On the production side, a sufficient condition is that F (k, k∗, nh) is of Cobb-Douglas type. Specifically
of the following form
Y = F (kt, k∗t , ntht) = A(kt)
α1(k∗t )
α2(ntht)1−α1−α2 (39)
where A is a positive scalar, and α1, α2 and (1 − α1 − α2) are the elasticities of output with respect to
domestic capital, imported capital or the intermediate good, and labor, respectively.
For the sake of tractability, we assume that the government has time invariant policy rules, which means
the reserve–ratio, γt, the money supply growth–rate, µt, and the tax–rate, τt, are constant over time. Given
this, the economy is characterized by the following system of balanced growth equations:
gσpi
(
n(α1+α2)
1− n
)
θ
(1− τ)(1− α1 − α2) = β
k
c
A
(
k∗
k
)α2 (h∗
k
)(1−α1−α2)
(40)
gσpi = β[1 + (1− τ)Rd] (41)
gσ = β[wn(1− τ) + (1− δh)] (42)
gσ = β[r(1− τ) + (1− δk)] (43)
RL =
Rd
1− γ (44)
w = (1− α1 − α2)A
(
k∗
k
)α2
n(−α1−α2)
(
h
k
)(−α1−α2)
(45)
r = α1A
(
k∗
k
)α2
n(1−α1−α2)
(
h
k
)(1−α1−α2)
(46)
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(1 + (1− τ)RL)
pi
= α2(1− τ)A
(
k∗
k
)(α2−1)
n(1−α1−α2)
(
h
k
)(1−α1−α2)
(47)
(g + δk − 1) = ik
k
(48)
(g + δh − 1) = ih
k
k
h
(49)
g
k∗
k
=
Lˆ
k
(50)
g =
ik∗
k
k
k∗
(51)
Lˆ
k
= (1− γ) dˆ
k
(52)
pig = µ (53)
pi = ε (54)
mˆ
k
= γ
dˆ
k
(55)
c
k
+
ik
k
+
ih
k
= (1− ϕ)A
(
k∗
k
)α2
n(1−α1−α2)
(
h
k
)(1−α1−α2)
(56)
where pi = pt+1pt is the steady-state level of inflation; ε =
et+1
et
is the steady-state level of exchange rate
depreciation of domestic currency; g = ct+1ct =
ikt+1
ikt
= iht+1iht =
ik∗
t+1
ik∗t
= kt+1kt =
k∗t+1
k∗t
= ht+1ht =
dˆt+1
dˆt
= Lˆt+1
Lˆt
=
mˆt+1
mˆt
= (wt+1ht+1)(wtht) is the balanced growth rate of the economy;
c
k ,
ik
k ,
ih
k ,
x
k , and
k∗
k are the long-run ratios of
the respective parts of output relative to the size of the capital stock;4 dˆ (= dp ) is size of real deposit; Lˆ (=
L
p )
is size of real loans; mˆ is the real money holdings by the banks to meet the cash reserve requirements; and
n is the balanced growth level of labor supply. This a non-linear system of seventeen equations in seventeen
variables, g, pi, ε, Rd, RL, ck ,
ik
k ,
ih
k ,
h
k ,
k∗
k ,
ik∗
k ,
dˆ
k ,
Lˆ
k ,
mˆ
k , w, r and n and can be solved given the values of
the policy variables µ, τ and γ, to trace the long-run reaction of the system to a change in policy.
5 Calibration
The next step in the analysis is to choose values for the parameters of the model. The values come from
either a priori information or so that various endogenous variables, along the models balanced growth path,
match the long run values observed in the data for Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The parameters that
needs to be calibrated can be grouped under the following three categories:
4Recall x = ϕAα1 (k∗)α2 (nh)(1−α1−α2)
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Preference: β, θ, and σ.
Production: A, α1, α2 and δk, δk.
Policy: γ, µ, τ .
Export-GDP ratio: ϕ
The country–specific calibrations are reported in Table 5. Note unless otherwise stated, the source for all
data is the IMF – International Financial Statistics (IFS). A first set of parameter values is given by numbers
usually found in the literature. These are:
• n: following Zimmermann (1997) the share of time devoted to market activities, is set to 0.3, except
for Portugal, for which n is set to 0.18 using the findings of Correia, Neves and Rebelo (1995). As
Zimmermann (1997) points out, the value used here, for Italy Spain and Greece, is, “based on the
observation that about one–third of waking time (less personal care) is used for market labor by
American households”;
• σ: the relative risk aversion parameter is set to 1 and then to 2, to show that the inflation–repression
relationship is qualitatively unaffected for the choice of different values to the risk aversion parameter;
• (1 − α1 − α2)=α3: since the production function is Cobb-Douglas, this corresponds to the share of
effective labor in income. α3 for Spain, Italy and Greece is derived from Zimmermann (1997) and the
value for Portugal is obtained from Correia, Neves and Rebelo (1995). The values are 62.7 percent
(Spain), 61.7 percent (Italy), 59.8 percent (Greece), and 53.0 percent (Portugal);
• δk: the depreciation rate of physical capital for Spain, Italy and Greece is derived from Zimmermann
(1997) and the value for Portugal is obtained from Correia, Neves and Rebelo (1995). The values range
between .032 (Greece) and .052 (Italy); δh: the depreciation rate of human capital. And without any
loss of generality is assumed to be equal to δk;
• β: the discount factor is set at 0.98.5
5For details see Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1994).
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A second set of parameters is determined individually for each country. Here, we use averages over the
whole sample period to find values that do not depend on the current business cycle. These parameters,
which are also listed in Table 5, are:
• ikY : is the physical capital investment output ratio and ranges between 0.214 (Greece) and 0.275
(Portugal);
• g: the annual gross growth rate in per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ranges between 1.0186,
i.e., 1.86 percent (Greece) to 1.0295, i.e., 2.95 percent (Portugal);
• pi: the annual gross rate of inflation lies between 1.0752, i.e., 7.52 percent (Spain) and 1.1516 , i.e.,
15.16 percent (Greece);
• γ: the annual reserve–deposit ratio lies between 0.137 (Italy) and 0.235 (Greece);
• τ : the tax rate, calculated as the ratio of tax–receipts to GDP, lies between 0.2274 (Greece) and 0.3625
(Italy);
• k∗Y : the ratio of the imported intermediate input to output ranges between 0.067 (Italy) and 0.146
(Greece).
• ϕ: the ratio of exports to output ranges between 0.191 (Portugal) and 0.264 (Greece).
The following parameters are determined from the balanced growth paths to match long-run averages of
the endogenous variables of the model. The parameters have been reported in Table 5.
• α2: is the share of foreign intermediate good in domestic output and is calibrated using equations
(42), (43), (45), (46) and (47). Given that we have two alternative values for the interest rate on
loans, corresponding to two different values of the risk-preference parameter, we also have two different
values for the share of imported intermediate input in output. For σ = 1, the share ranges between
7.0 percent (Spain and Italy) and 14.0 percent (Portugal), and between 6.0 percent (Spain and Italy)
and 12.0 percent (Portugal) when σ = 2. Note given α2 and (1 − α1 − α2), we can easily calculate
α1, the share of domestic physical capital in output. For σ = 1, the share ranges between 27.2 percent
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(Greece) and 33.0 percent (Portugal), and between 29.2 percent (Greece) and 35.0 percent (Portugal)
when σ = 2;
• A: the technology parameter, is calibrated from equations (43) and (46) and have two alternative
values corresponding to the two alternative values of the risk preference parameter. For σ = 1, the
A ranges between 0.69 (Greece) and 1.28 (Portugal), and between 0.79 (Greece) and 1.67 (Portugal)
when σ = 2;
• θ: the value of θ, the preference parameter for is obtained from equation (40). We obtain two values
of the preference parameter for each country corresponding to two alternative values of the relative
risk aversion parameter σ. For σ = 1, the parameter lies between 2.52 (Italy) and 6.01 (Portugal) and
between 2.0 (Italy) and 3.70 (Portugal) when σ = 2.;
• µ: the annual money growth rate for the four economies, is calibrated using equation (53). The
money growth rate parameter lies between 1.103, i.e., 10.30 percent (Spain) and 1.173 i.e., 17.3 percent
(Greece);
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]
It must be noted that to obtain the value for α2, we need to solve for the Rd, RL, and k
∗
k using equations
(41), (44) and, using the kY and
k∗
Y , respectively. Similarly, for A, we need to pin down the values of
h
k , in
addition to the values of the endogenous variables, used to obtain α2. The value for hk is obtained from the
equations (42), (43), (45) and (46). Finally, to obtain the value of θ, we need the values for ikk ,
ih
k and
c
k ,
obtained from equations (48), (49) and (56), respectively. The values of these endogenous variables of the
model, obtained from the long-run balanced growth path and used to obtain α2, A and θ have been reported
in Table 6, and are as follows:
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE]
19
6 Financial Liberalization and Inflationary Dynamics
We are now ready to analyze the effects of financial liberalization in our benchmark model. Note, financial
repression has been modeled as banks being obligated to maintain a “high” reserve requirement, i.e., a
high value of γ, in our case. In this sense, financial liberalization would imply a reduction in the size of
the obligatory reserve requirement, γ, and hence allowing the financial intermediaries to loan out a larger
fraction of their deposits as loans to fulfill the investment requirement of the firms.
Due to the non-linearity of the system of equations, the relationship obtained between the rate inflation
and the policy variables, τ , µ, and γ cannot be solved explicitly to obtain a reduced-form solution. Hence,
we plot the implicit function, specifying the relationship between inflation and reserve requirements, given
the other policy parameters.
Figures 1 through 8, depicts the policy experiment, where we increase the reserve–deposit ratio, γ, in a
phase–wise manner in the closed interval of 0 to 0.99. Figure 1 through Figure 4 depicts the relationship
between the rate of inflation and the reserve–deposit ratio, when σ =1. And Figures 5 through 8 plots
the inflation–repression relationship σ =2. The positive relationship stands out for all the economies for
both σ =1 and σ =2. As is evident from the Figures 1 through 8, the effect of the reserve requirement on
inflation tend to gather momentum at higher values of the latter, but is otherwise extremely weak and seems
non-existent.
[INSERT FIGURES 1 THROUGH 8 HERE]
In Table 7, using the calibrated parameters we report the values of the derivative of steady–state inflation
with respect to the repression parameter, γ, evaluated at the long-run values of γ. The values are obtained
by using the Implicit-Function Theorem.
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE]
Note both for σ=1 and σ=2 the value of the derivative always indicates a positive inflation–repression
relationship. However, the value of the derivatives indicate values way less than the sizes of the simple
regressional coefficient reported in Table 3. Moreover, when the risk aversion parameter, σ =2, a much
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weaker inflation–repression relationship is portrayed for all the economies. This is understandable since, the
inverse of the degree of relative risk aversion measures the elasticity of savings with respect to interest rate.
Given the interest rate on loans, as reserve requirement is reduced, the interest rate on deposits, and the
returns on human capital investment and domestic capital investment increases, given (19). Increases in the
supply of savings responds more in the case of the lower value of the relative risk aversion parameter. With
relatively more investment generated with σ=1 as compared to the case of σ=2, there is comparatively,
higher growth and lower inflation, for the former case.6 The model is thus incapable of explaining the
negative inflation-repression relationship observed in the data for Greece.
7 Conclusion and Areas of Further Research
The paper analyzes the effects of removal of financial distortions on the rate of inflation, in the context
of four semi–industrialized Southern European economies — Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain, over the
period of 1980 to 1998. The analysis is carried out by developing a microfounded, monetary – endogenous
growth dynamic general equilibrium model, for a small open semi-industrialized economy relying on imports
of intermediate input. Moreover, financial repression is modeled through the obligation of the commercial
banks to maintain a “high” proportion of the deposits as reserves.
In such a framework, we obtain a positive relationship between inflation and financial repression, as
observed in the data for three (Spain, Italy, and Portugal) of the four economies. The results are in accordance
with the widely available empirical evidence on inflation and reserve-ratio. However, the model fails to explain
the negative effects of reserve requirements on inflation for Greece. Moreover, the strength of the relationship
derived from the model is way below when compared to the sizes of the regressional coefficient in the two-
variable regression between inflation and financial repression. The relationship tends to become even weaker
with the increase in the degree of risk aversion. In terms of policy the model proposes liberalization of the
domestic financial sector, but indicates that the effect might be marginal on inflation.
Though the paper, to some extent, fills up the dearth of comprehensive microfounded models that can be
6Note, given equation (53), growth is negatively related to the financial repression parameter. Moreover, from equation (54),
the movement in inflation mirrors that of the nominal exchange rate.
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calibrated to small open financially repressed economies, there are certain unanswered issues. For example,
future research needs to be targeted to realize if the case of Greece is merely an abberation. Moreover, it
might be interesting to analyze whether addition of portfolio and capital adjustment costs can add meat to
the strength of the relationship between inflation and reserve requirements. The General Forms are: Books:
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Hogg, R. and Craig, A. (1971), International to Mathematical Statistics, Macmillan Company, New York.
Periodicals: Metwally, M.M. (1975) ”Advertising and Competitive Behavior of Selected Australian
Firms”. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 57, No. 4, Nov. pp. 1-32.
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Table 1: Financial Facts in European Economies (1980-2002)
Reserves/ Annual Interest Rate Credit Ceiling
Deposits Inflation Liberalization Relaxation
(percentage) rate
Spain 12.0 6.8 1984 1959-66
Greece 22.9 14.9 1980 1982-87
Italy 11.7 7.5 1980 1973-83
Portugal 17.5 12.2 1984 1978-91
Belgium 1.0 3.2 1986 Until 1978
France 2.0 4.1 1980 1958-85
Germany 5.6 2.5 1980 None
UK 1.7 5.2 1980 1964-71
Source: IFS – IMF International Financial Statistics.
Inflation is the percentage change in the GDP Deflator.
Deposit has been calculated from lines 24 and 25.
Sources: Tables 3.4, 4.1 and 5.1 in Caprio, Honohan and Stiglitz (2001).
Table 2: Bank Reserve Ratios
Spain Italy Greece Portugal
1980-1986 15.8 15.5 22.1 20.5
1986-1991 19.3 17.2 19.6 26.4
1992-1997 9.0 10.6 26.0 15.3
1998-2002 3.0 2.3 23.5 7.1
Source: See Table 1.
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Table 3: Inflation-Repression Correlation Coefficients (1980-1998)
c0 c1
Spain 0.062 0.097
(3.25) (0.82)
Greece 0.30 -0.62**
(6.53) (-3.29)
Italy .013 .53*
(0.30) (1.75)
Portugal 0.041 0.45*
(0.78) (1.81)
Notes: Data source: IFS-IMF International Financial Statistics.
Regression results emerge from the following equation:
pit = c0 + c1γt + ²t.
where pi: Rate of inflation,
γ: Reserve-deposit ratio,
ci, i = 0, 1: regression coefficients,
² ∼ N(0, σ2).
Inflation is the percentage change in the GDP Deflator.
Deposit has been calculated from lines 24 and 25.
Numbers in the parentheses indicates the t-ratios.
** significant at 1 percent level.
* significant at 10 percent level.
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Table 4: FDI and Import of Intermediate Materials in European Economies (1980-2001)
FDI/GDP (Intermediate Materials)/ (Intermediate Materials)/
(Total Trade) GDP
Spain 2.31 15.95 6.45
Greece 0.74 12.44 13.09
Italy 0.78 17.03 6.21
Portugal 1.81 13.92 11.97
Belgium 7.30 9.71 10.62
France 3.44 10.87 3.69
Germany 7.54 10.87 3.73
UK 14.79 7.58 4.38
Sources: www.worldinfigures.org; www.sourceoecd.org.
Notes: Categorization based on SITC 2 and 3.
Total Trade is sum of trade in goods and trade in services.
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Table 7: Inflation–Repression Relationship ( δpiδγ )
σ = 1 σ = 2
Spain 0.001 0.0006
Italy 0.001 0.0006
Greece 0.004 0.002
Portugal 0.005 0.003
Notes: Values evaluated at steady-states.
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Figure 1: Inflation Repression Relationship for Spain
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Figure 2: Inflation Repression Relationship for Italy
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Figure 3: Inflation Repression Relationship for Greece
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Figure 4: Inflation Repression Relationship for Portugal
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 Gamma
1
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
Gross Inflation
Figure 5: Inflation Repression Relationship for Spain
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Figure 6: Inflation Repression Relationship for Italy
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Figure 7: Inflation Repression Relationship for Greece
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Figure 8: Inflation Repression Relationship for Portugal
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